Georgetown University Law Center

Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW

2012

What’s Right About the Medical Model in Human Subjects
Research Regulation
Heidi Li Feldman
Georgetown University Law Center, feldmanh@georgetown.edu

Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 12-151

This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1097
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2161624

Heidi Li Feldman, What’s Right About the Medical Model in Human Subjects Research
Regulation, in THE FUTURE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS RESEARCH (Cambridge: The MIT Press
forthcoming 2014)
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub
Part of the Bioethics and Medical Ethics Commons, Epistemology Commons, and the Health Law and Policy
Commons

What’s Right About the Medical Model in Human Subjects
Research Regulation
Heidi Li Feldman 1
Georgetown University Law Center
October 14, 2012
(in The Future of Human Subjects Research, Cambridge: The MIT
Press, forthcoming Spring 2014)
Abstract:
Critics of Institutional Review Board practices often base their charges on the
claim that IRB review began with and is premised upon a "medical model" of
research, and hence a "medical model" of risk. Based on this claim, they
charge that IRB review, especially in the social and behavioral sciences, has
experienced "mission creep". This paper argues that this line of critique is
fundamentally misguided. While it remains unclear what critics mean by
"medical model", the point of contemporary human research subjects
regulation remains the same across all domains of research. That point is to
protect the autonomy of human subjects, primarily through the use of
informed consent. In fields as different as biomedical self-experimentation
and ethnography there is the danger of losing sight of subjects' autonomy.
Critiques of the so-called medical model are sometimes libertarian and
sometimes utilitarian in spirit. Either way, such critiques have not yet
demonstrated that these philosophical schools of thought have the resources
to guard against the potential risk of harm that lexically prioritizing the
autonomy of human subjects does. Precisely because IRB review recognizes
that human subjects research occurs in different fields using different
research methods, IRB review requires researchers to explain their particular
methods, the particular risks of harm created by these methods, and the
implementation of procedures by which subjects may autonomously consent
to precisely those risks.
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What’s Right About the Medical Model in Human Subjects
Research Regulation
Bioethics experts Paul Weindling and Volker Roelcke suggest that
current bioethical thinking may use an incomplete picture of the
historical context of the Nuremberg code. Volker Roelcke writes:
“rather than being the result of a coercive state, Nazi medicine
illustrates how medical researchers and their representative bodies
[…] co-operated with and even manipulated a totalitarian state and
political system relying on expert opinion, in order to gain resources
for the conduct of research without any moral and legal regulation.”
He states that Nazi doctors “followed the intrinsic logic of their
scientific disciplines and used the legally and ethically unrestricted
access to human beings created by the context of the political system
and the conditions of war.” - WHO Bulletin, on the occasion of the
60th anniversary of the Nuremberg Code (Theiren 2007)

Introduction
A prominent strand of criticism of the current IRB system contends that
today’s “Common Rule” -- the foundational U.S. regulation for research on
human subjects regulation -- presupposes a "medical model" for research on
human subjects and regulation thereof (Van Den Hoonaard 2001, 38; Hoeyer
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2005; Nelson 2004). Critics assert that this makes the IRB system
inappropriate, even ethically corrupt, particularly for regulating research in
the social and behavioral sciences. These critics warn that IRB review unduly
threatens academic freedom, especially for qualitative researchers who
employ “inquiry models that take explicit account of alternative
epistemologies,” epistemologies that do not “focus on objectivity and causal
connections, as well as generalizability” (Lincoln 2005, 171).
These complaints have bite only if the so-called medical model
erroneously introduces a mistaken conception of the ethical perils posed by
research on or with human subjects. Whatever the merits of the claim that
qualitative research involves fundamentally different epistemologies than
quantitative research does, it does not follow that a different way of knowing
necessarily, or even probably, changes the ethical threats to human research
subjects. To assess the grounds for concern expressed by champions of
academic freedom in social and behavioral and/or qualitative research, we
must ascertain the ethical threats targeted by the current Common Rule and
check whether these threats relate only to the “medical model.”
The major threat addressed by the Common Rule is compromise of a
human research subject's autonomy. The Common Rule relies on a number
of measures, especially informed consent, to prevent researchers from
disenabling or ignoring subjects’ capacity for agency or self-determination
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when it comes to participating in the research project. The relevant
conception of autonomy is neither idealized nor utopian. It does not equate
autonomy with decisionmaking from an entirely pure standpoint, one
completely unadulterated by context or personal traits. Whatever the
possibility or worth of that conception of autonomy, it is not the conception
that underlies today's principles of respect for human subjects as reflected in
The Common Rule. Today's principles emerged from an awareness that a
much less rarified conception of autonomy is in play when researchers make
humans their subjects. On this conception, the decision to participate in
research should be just that: a decision, a relatively conscious, relatively
uncoerced choice to involve oneself in an activity not ordinarily encountered
in one's daily life, and therefore to encounter risks different in degree and
kind than those one would otherwise face. A researcher is not expected to
create a Kantian hyperworld for human subjects. After all, researchers
themselves do not live in such a world. In addition to IRB oversight,
researchers operate under other constraints, for example, whether they have
financial support to pursue their work and whether they can obtain
sufficiently talented helpers. The Common Rule expects and requires
researchers to make good faith efforts to understand the risks and harms
their research may pose to potential subjects and to convey that
understanding to potential and ongoing subjects. Essentially, this means
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treating the subject as having a certain equality with the researcher: an
equality of autonomy when it comes to research.
Such equality demands that, as the researcher may decide whether and
how to conduct her studies, the subject may also decide whether and how to
participate. Researchers do not embark upon their work without an
opportunity to consider how it may harm them. Researchers can choose to
abandon their projects. A researcher respects a subject's autonomy, his status
as a self-determining agent, by according the subject the same meaningful
opportunity to choose to participate and then to continue participating in the
enterprise.
Whatever methods a researcher uses, whatever the degree of risk
posed by these, whatever the kind of possible harms involved, the question of
a subject's autonomous participation remains the same. Different methods,
different degrees of risk, and different kinds of harms may have to be
explained differently in order for somebody to authentically authorize her
participation in research. But to be authentic, authorization must rest on
knowledge of the particulars of the project.2

The Emergence of a Principle of Robust Consent
As is well known, the origins of the Common Rule lie in the Nuremberg
Code, itself a product of post World War II war trials that assessed the
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criminality of research on human subjects performed under the auspices of
Adolf Hitler’s Third Reich. In these trials, neither prosecutors nor defendants
concerned themselves with today's categorization of research into biomedical,
social, and behavioral. The Nuremberg prosecutors focused on a more
relevant distinction: between research and the other conduct at issue in the
war trials. Most of the acts for which defendants were prosecuted involved
the infliction of pain, injury, and death, as did the research for which some
defendants were on trial for conducting. Yet scientists, doctors, and their
aides were not prosecuted for torture or murder. They were prosecuted for
criminal research on human subjects, done for so-called “anthropological
purposes” (Nuremberg Military Tribunals 1946-1949, 1:37).
This research followed a "therapeutic pattern" (Nuremberg Military
Tribunals 1946-1949, 1:37):

Experiments concerning high altitude, the effect of cold, and
the potability of processed sea water have an obvious relation
to aeronautical and naval combat and rescue problems. The
mustard gas and phosphorous burn experiments, as well as
those relating to the healing value of sulfanilamide for wounds,
can be related to air-raid and battlefield medical problems. It is
well known that malaria, epidemic jaundice, and typhus were
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among the principal diseases which had to be combated by the
German Armed Forces and by German authorities in occupied
territories. … To some degree, the therapeutic pattern
outlined above is undoubtedly a valid one, and explains why the
Wehrmacht, and especially the German Air Force, participated
in these experiments. (1:37)

Furthermore, experiments were performed to develop a new branch
of science, the science of efficient genocide. The prosecution termed this
science “thanatology” (Nuremberg Military Tribunals 1946-1949, 38). “The
thanatological knowledge … supplied the techniques for genocide. … This
policy of mass extermination could not have been so effectively carried out
without the active participation of German medical scientists” (1:38).
The scientists and doctors prosecuted at Nuremberg included
prominent professionals, their stature established before the rise of the Third
Reich.

Outstanding men of science, distinguished for their scientific
ability in Germany and abroad, are the defendants Rostock and
Rose. Both exemplify, in their training and practice alike, the
highest traditions of German medicine. Rostock headed the
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Department of Surgery at the University of Berlin and served
as dean of its medical school. Rose studied under the famous
surgeon, Enderlen, at Heidelberg and then became a
distinguished specialist in the fields of public health and tropical
diseases. Handloser and Schroeder are outstanding medical
administrators. Both of them made their careers in military
medicine and reached the peak of their profession. Five more
defendants are much younger men who are nevertheless
already known as the possessors of considerable scientific
ability, or capacity in medical administration. These include the
defendants Karl Brandt, Ruff, Beiglboeck, Schaefer, and BeckerFreyseng. (Nuremberg Military Tribunals 1946-1949, 1:68)

These prominent administrators, scientists, and doctors did not simply engage
in thoughtless killing. The experiments conducted by the German medical
establishment in conjunction with the Third Reich served therapuetic medical
ends, such as an understanding of the effects of chemical warfare and extreme
climatological conditions on aviators and others, and a social end, the
development of thanatology, the efficient elimination of segments of the
population deemed undesirable.
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The Nuremberg prosecutors did not concern themselves with
whether thanatology was a biomedical science or a social or behavioral one.
This is because the prosecution focused on how the human subjects were
treated qua subjects by those who used them for their research purposes, as
those purposes were understood by the researchers themselves. The
Nuremberg prosecutors did not rest their case on the distastefulness of the
purposes of the researchers or on the epistemological style or value of the
research design or even on the pain and suffering experienced by the human
subjects. The prosecutors focused on the failure of the researchers to treat
those they experimented with as autonomous individuals capable of giving or
declining consent to participate in a project being imposed upon them, not
one they themselves devised or adopted as their own.
The prosecution emphasized two features of the experiments
performed under Hitler's auspices. First, that doctors, scientiests, and medical
administrators sought knowledge and understanding when they studied what
happened to people they exposed to malaria or plunged into ice cold water
for extended periods. Second, that researchers and administrators ignored
subjects' objections to participating and efforts to stop participating, even
when the subjects understood that a refusal to participate would put them in
line for execution or reassignment to wretched working conditions within a
concentration camp. Prosecutors concentrated on the meaningless of any
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formal consent given by subjects and the researcher's refusal to respect
requests to discontinue participation.
What came out of “The Doctors Trial” at Nuremberg was an official
statement that put meaningful consent at the heart of human research ethics.

The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely
essential. This means that the person involved should have legal
capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to
exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any
element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other
ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have
sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the
subject matter involved as to enable him to make an
understanding and enlightened decision. This latter element
requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision
by the experimental subject there should be made known to
him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment; the
method and means by which it is to be conducted; all
inconveniences and hazards reasonable to be expected; and the
effects upon his health or person which may possibly come
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from his participation in the experiment. (Nuremberg Military
Tribunals 1946-1949, 2:181)

Consent does not prevent injury or pain. It does not guarantee the
worthiness of the researcher's goals or her field of inquiry. Consent does,
however, force notice of the separateness of persons, an ethically important
fact closely associated the exercise of autonomy.

The Separateness of Persons
The separateness of persons signals the differences between different people's
ends and the distinctiveness of what goes into each person's flourishing. The
separateness of persons does not necessarily mean opposition between their
ends. Nor does it imply isolation or lack of relationships with other people.
Nor does separateness presuppose any particular power dynamics between
different individuals. Separateness is simply a feature of ethical life. Because of
separateness, we cannot simply conflate one person's ends or well-being with
another's. People may share ends, their well-being may be bound up with one
another, and they may be aware of this mutuality and connection. But shared
ends are shared by separate persons, and mutual well-being involves the
flourishing of separate individuals.
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When a person is caught up in the pursuit of his or her own ends, it
is psychologically easy for him or her to discount other people's ends, to
downplay tension between realizing his or her own ends and respecting
others', and to give unwarranted priority to his or her own flourishing. This is
a matter of more then simple selfishness. It is a problem of perspective. Our
ends constitute a lens through which we see the world, making expedients
salient and masking potential obstacles, sometimes to the point of making
those potential obstacles invisible. Having a ready supply of human subjects
serves a researcher’s ends qua researcher; devoting time and energy to
ensuring subject autonomy, not so much. Fully informed subjects may decline
to participate at all, possibly elevating informed consent from an
inconvenience to a serious impediment. The separateness of persons is hard
for researchers to keep in mind not because of something inherent in any
academic discipline or experimental design, but because of many of the traits
that distinguish successful researchers. Consider some of these traits:
passionate inquisitiveness, commitment to discovery and learning, ambition,
self-directedness, ability to focus. For a person with these qualities, one's own
ends loom particularly large. The separateness of others from one's own
projects tends to recede from view.
Philosophically, threats to the separateness of persons come from two
directions. One is from utilitarianism. Utilitarianism collapses all individuals
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into one aggregated bearer of a single end, maximization of utility, however
utility is then understood (Rawls 1999, 24). The other threat stems, perhaps
somewhat surprisingly, from libertarianism. Libertarianism's individualistic
focus might suggest that a libertarian would never lose sight of the
separateness of others. But libertarianism's individualism is essentially first
personal. It threatens the separateness of others because of its elevation of
the significance of one's own self and one's own ends. Libertarianism invites
the individual to adopt a perspective from which the separateness of others
represents only a problem to be brushed besides, rather than an ethically
salient fact to be respected.
When researchers complain that ethical and legal regulation interferes
with their academic freedom, they voice a libertarian complaint.

What we are suggesting is that what is being taken out of an
individual’s hands is the ability to make decisions as an
autonomous researcher working within the healthy parameters
that the academy previously had established. Instead, in a
litigious environment, guidelines are developed that seek to
ensure that the institution is not liable to any risk. The
individual professor no longer fully decides the research design,
who to protect, where to conduct research, or what to ask.
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The institution determines the answers, and if the individual
disagrees, then the research shall not be done. (Tierney 2007,
397)

This is the libertarian voice, objecting to state-based regulation. Traditional
libertarianism is especially wary of the state, which the libertarian sees as the
major threat to individual autonomy. Libertarians traditionally have been less
concerned with other sources of threat to individual autonomy and freedom.
Thus, the libertarian researcher's does not focus on the threat to others'
autonomy that the researcher and his methods may pose. Without further
argument, however, it is difficult to conclude that the only ethically significant
threats to individual freedom arising in the research context derive from the
state's regulation of researchers, whether direct or through delegation to
bodies within a researcher's institution.

Closeness Can Threaten Separateness: Ethnography and SelfExperimentation
The problem of losing sight of separateness does not correlate with whether
a method calls for intimacy or formality between researcher and subject or
whether it requires physical proximity and interaction or physical distance
with no direct interaction. Certainly, other people's separateness can go
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unnoticed when we situate ourselves so far from them that we cannot make
them out distinctly. To us they become dots on our own horizon, blending
with the context in which we pursue our own ends. But there is another path
to effacing the separateness of others. This is the path of closeness, of
intimacy. Consider the ethnographer self-consciously devoted to a
hermeneutic fusion of horizons with those she goes to observe.

For ethnographers, the primary data-gathering tool consists of
the relationships that we forge with those whose lifeworld we
are trying to understand. Few of us start with specific
hypotheses that we will later test in any systematic way. … We
cannot inform our subjects of the risks and benefits of
cooperating with us for a number of reasons. First, the risks
and benefits for subjects are not so different from those of
normal interaction with a stranger who will become a close
acquaintance, an everyday feature of a lifeworld, and then
disappear, after observing intimate moments, exploring deep
feelings, and asking embarrassing questions. There is the risk
inherent in any fleeting human relationship—the risk of bruised
feelings that come from being used, the loss when a fixture in a
social world disappears, or the hurt of realizing that however
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differently it felt in the moment, one was used as a means to an
end. This risk is magnified by a certain unavoidable deception in
every ethnographic investigation, a certain pretense that comes
from trying to have both researcher and informant forget that
what is going on is not a normal, natural exchange but
research—not just everyday life as it naturally occurs but
work, a job, a project—”No really, I’m interested in what you
have to say, think, feel, and believe for more than my own
narrow instrumental academic purposes.” To some degree, we
cannot specify risks because we do not know what we will find,
what interpretive frameworks we will develop for reporting
what we do observe, and how the world around us will change
to make those findings seem more or less significant. Finally,
we cannot define risk because few of us believe that being an
ethnographic informant is a risky business. We believe this
despite considerable anthropological and sociological evidence
to the contrary. (Bosk 2004, 253)

This remarkably frank, self-reflective assessment of the practice and point of
ethnography highlights how getting too close to somebody else encourages
both parties to ignore or forget their separateness. While this happens in
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ordinary life, it becomes a matter for human research ethics when a
researcher goes out of her way to forge the intimate connections, not for
private or essentially personal reasons, but for the sake of pursuing
knowledge intended to be shared at large. At that juncture, the researcher
occupies a different relationship to those with whom she is forging intimacy
than they are forging with her. It is this research oriented relationship, I argue,
the researcher must share with the subject if the subject's autonomy is to be
preserved.
A similar problem of preserving subject autonomy in the face of
intimacy arises in a research setting that may well seem radically different
from the ethnographer's: the context of self-experimentation by physicians
and other biomedical researchers. In that framework, potentially problematic
closeness of subject to researcher and (vice-versa) arises because the subject
and the researcher are the same person, although each persona may occupy
very different facets of that person’s makeup. How can a researcher gain
sufficient perspective on the aspects of herself not caught up in the research
program to know that her decision or agreement to experiment on herself
does not stampede the parts of her with projects and ends detached from,
and perhaps endangered by, the ends of her research? Just as ethnography
calls for a fusion of horizons between the observer and the observed, and
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therefore a deconstruction of boundaries, a similar deconstruction is
demanded when biomedical researchers experiment on themselves.
Some biomedical researchers have recognized this explicitly. Consider
David Clyde, a physician and parasitologist who worked on developing a
vaccine against resistant malaria in the 1970s. (Shiff et al. 2003). Clyde
experimented on “prisoner-volunteers” just when concern was mounting
over a prisoner's ability to genuinely consent to be a human subject given the
coercive atmosphere of prison settings (Altman 1986, 161). Clyde himself did
not have this worry but he did maintain that at least one scientist must go
through the experimental process with the prisoners. Clyde specifically
wanted to find out “about any side-effects such as lingering taste, nausea,
insomnia, which, being subjective, were difficult to elicit by questioning
others” (Altman 1986, 161). In other words, Clyde wanted to know about the
effects of the vaccine from the inside out, by inhabiting the perspective of the
subject as well as that of the researcher. Presumably, Clyde found value in
reporting his own subjective experience of malaria despite his reservations
about gaining understanding through others' self-reports of their experience
of experimental vaccines.
Other biomedical researchers evidence the deconstruction of the
subject-researcher boundary by noting that even when they are obviously
experimenting on themselves, they do not conceive of themselves as research
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subjects. Consider Dr. Scott M. Smith, who investigated the use of curare to
be used in conjunction with anesthesia (Utah Society of Anesthesiologists). In
1946, Smith wanted to know whether curare eliminated the sensation of pain
as well stilling muscle movement. This required receiving increments of
curare and signaling to observers whether he experienced pain or other
sensations while under the influence of the drug.

In the hope of getting a clear-cut answer to his questions,
Smith decided to take a dose three times larger than he had
ever administered to a patient. “It may sound funny,” he said,
“but I did not think that I was experimenting on myself. I
believed the drug was safe because I had used so much of it
already [on other people, without their knowledge] and had
observed its action. And there was an antidote – neostigmine –
available. (Altman 1986, 82)

Thirty years after the experiment, Smith observed that he never considered
performing it on somebody else, and that even if it had occurred to him to do
so, he “doubt[ed] [he] could have convinced anyone else to participate”
(Altman 1986, 82).
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Whereas Clyde self-consciously used self-experimentation as a tool
for ascertaining “subjective” effects of a drug, Smith's use of himself as a
research subject seemed to distract him entirely from the fact that he was
self-experimenting. Both men's experiences and their interpretations of them
illustrate how self-experimentation closes the gap between researcher and
subject. Clyde lost his distrust of subjective self-reporting when he reported
to himself; Smith lost his sense of what constituted research on a human
subject. Just as the ethnographer relies on a sort of perspectival sleight of
hand, so does the biomedical self-experimenter. The illusions relied upon may
yield revelations but they can also obscure important aspects of what is
actually happening.
Altering one's perspective to achieve closeness to research subjects
(yourself or others) may or may not interfere with scholarly value of one's
findings. Regardless, such closeness and conflation of perspectives can distort
both the researcher's and the subject's perception of the risks and harms
associated with the experiment. If people become research subjects without
an appropriate appreciation of such risks and harms, they cannot be
participating autonomously. To be the author of the decision to participate in
a potentially dangerous situation that you would not ordinarily encounter, you
need to appreciate that the situation is indeed out of the ordinary and that it
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might cause you physical, psychic, or economic injury. You must be positioned
to see these features.
This is the point of informed consent. Informed consent implements
the separateness of persons. The process of obtaining informed consent is a
mechanism for communicating information, fostering understanding, and
provoking the subject to consider the methods, risk level, and type of
potential harms to which she may expose herself should she choose to
participate. Informed consent is not an end in itself. It is a tool for highlighting
the subject's separateness from the researcher even when both are embodied
in the same person, and then using that separateness as a way to confer a
perspective on the research and the subject's role in it such that the subject
has a meaningful opportunity to authorize her participation.

Conclusion
Nazi sanctioned research gave rise to the Nuremberg Code’s lexical
prioritization of subject autonomy over other ends and values. One major
threat to subject autonomy, obfuscation of the separateness of persons and
the ethical significance of that fact, can arise in settings as apparently different
as ethnography and biomedical self-experimentation. The central aim of IRB
regulation is to preserve subject autonomy whatever the research settings.
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It is not entirely clear what critics of today's Common Rule mean by a
"medical model" or its influence on current regulation of human subjects
research. If by “medical model”, critics simply mean an approach to human
subject research that gives subject autonomy priority over other interests and
values, their beef is not with anything peculiar to medical research or to
biomedical experimentation. Their beef might be with giving subject
autonomy that lexical priority. If so, they need to make the case that some
other end or value trumps subject autonomy or at least should be weighed
against it as a possible reason for permitting researchers to experiment on
human subjects without providing them as full and meaningful an opportunity
as possible to authorize their own participation.
IRB regulation based on the protection of autonomy via informed
consent procedures is not totalitarian nor intolerant of variety in research
methods and fields of study. Indeed, IRB regulation treats social, behavioral,
and scientific research with equal gravity. When one person examines another
for the purpose of scholarship and public knowledge, the possibility of
encroaching upon the subject’s autonomy does not vary according to the
disciplinary categories that may be relevant for other purposes. IRB review
based on the Common Rule focuses on safeguarding autonomy in context.
IRBs consider the specifics of protocols from different disciplines. To the
extent that different methods or fields vary in how they may interfere with
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subject autonomy, the Common Rule allows researchers to tailor their
informed consent procedures to those specifics.
Perhaps those who charge that the “medical model” is irrelevant to
social and behavioral research have a slightly different concern. Perhaps they
believe that the major ethical problem arising from human subject research is
the infliction, or risk of infliction, of physical injury. The current Common Rule
does not directly protect against this specific problem. It does attempt a
certain kind of protection for subjects, but not direct protection from
physical harm. Current regulation aims to create a situation where subjects
can meaningfully decide for themselves which risks of whatever harms to
undertake. The need to regulate for this purpose arises whenever research
poses a significant degree of risk of injury, whether physical, emotional or
financial, whether tangible or intangible. Injuries and risks are not exclusive to
medical research. An accidental dissemination of personal data collected in a
survey may lead to emotional and financial injuries more extreme than some
nontrivial physical ones. Interviews with those who have lived through years
of civil war or been subject to war crimes may cause intense psychological
discomfort or mental anguish. The point of making autonomy central to
human subjects research regulation is to ensure that potential subjects
understand such risks, and then choose for themselves whether to participate
in research. The significance of autonomy does not vary according to the type
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of possible injury, although risks of different kinds of injury may require
different techniques for ensuring autonomous participation in human subjects
research.
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